Transition to Science 2.0: “Remoralizing” the Economy of Science by Tyfield, David
Transition to Science 2.0: “Remoralizing” the Economy of Science
Author(s): David Tyfield
Source: Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of
Science, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2013) 29-48.
Published by: The University of Toronto
DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v7i1.19664
E D I T O R I A L O F F I C E S
Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology
Room 316 Victoria College, 91 Charles Street West
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1K7
hapsat.society@utoronto.ca
Published online at jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/SpontaneousGenerations
ISSN 1913 0465
Founded in 2006, Spontaneous Generations is an online academic journal published
by graduate students at the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science
and Technology, University of Toronto. There is no subscription or membership fee.
Spontaneous Generations provides immediate open access to its content on the principle
that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange
of knowledge.
F D I P
Transition to Science 2.0
‘Remoralizing’ the Economy of Science*
David Tyfield†
The present is a moment of crisis and transition, both generally and
specifically in “knowledge” and its institutions. Acknowledging this
elicits the key questions: where are we? Where are we headed? What,
if anything, can be done about this? And what can the “economics
of science” contribute to this? This paper assumes a “cultural political
economy of research & innovation” (CPERI) perspective to explore the
current upheaval and transition in the system of academic knowledge
production, at the confluence of accelerating commercialisation and
the seemingly opposing movement of “open science.” This perspective
affords a characterisation of the core of the current crises as a crisis
of moral economy; an issue to which a political economy of epistemic
authority is in turn crucial. A “remoralizing” of knowledge production
is thus a maer of key systemic importance, though it is important
to understand such developments in power-strategic, and not explicitly
moral, terms. Much of the current moves towards “open science”
and “massively open online courses” (MOOCs) can also then be seen
as self-defeating developments that simply exacerbate the crisis of a
viable “economy of science” and in no sense its solution. Their lasting
significance, however, is more likely to lie precisely in their effects on
the construction of a new moral economy of knowledge production.
I. I
Almost everywhere one looks today regarding issues of political economy,
knowledge (science & technology, research & innovation) and their interaction,
there appears to be one, or rather, many crises. Some of these are the focus
of headlines and newspaper leaders—notably the ongoing economic depression
and the host of ecological and technological challenges that are usually
discussed in terms of climate change—while others are the more recondite
preserve of specialists, albeit perhaps with a broader “policy” relevance (e.g.
concerns regarding a dwindling innovation competitiveness vs. the resurgent
powers of the “global South”). Moreover, it is increasingly clear that many of
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these crises themselves, or at least ongoing aempts to resolve them, intimately
involve the continuing penetration of society by interactive social media (“web
2.0”) and associated technologies of “big data” analysis (Mayer-Schönberger
and Cukier 2013). Regarding science, these issues notably include “open access”
publishing, broader “open science” initiatives and the new hype regarding
“massively open online courses” (MOOCs).
In this context, it is unsurprising that interest in a literature on the
“transition” of “socio-technical systems” has surged (Geels 2005, 2011; Elzen et al.
2004; Smith et al. 2010). Most of this literature focuses on industrial/consumer
systems and charts both their former transitions to their current incarnations
and—the source of their current policy resonance—the prospects of and obstacles
to future transition, especially to “low-carbon” or environmental sustainability.
Its core, and compelling, argument is that a transition is never just a maer
of the introduction of new technologies (let alone a single technology), but is
a hugely complex socio-technical (and thus economic, political and cultural)
process involving the parallel realignment of multiple agents, factors and
practices, i.e. of a whole system. As such, there is a prima facie improbability
of systemic disruption from any specific innovation or new technology, given
how much else in society must be rearranged, coordinated and coproduced, and
in the face of resistance at all levels, not least from the incumbent system and
its major beneficiaries.
Regarding the economics of science, this literature features in its framework
the specific sciences and research institutions relevant to the “system” under
investigation, generating the theoretical expectation that these must evolve in
parallel with the broader change of the system. Given both the large and striking
differences across the disciplines today—the so-called disunity of science
(Dupré 1995)—and the increasing hybridity of research itself as “technoscience”
(Nordmann et al. 2011), this focus on the transformation of specific sciences
in their specific context of relevance is both entirely defensible and capable
of yielding important insights in the transformations of the “economics of
science.” However, such are the challenges to the core of the scientific knowledge
production (and circulation and reception) that are now underway, that a
similar analysis seems warranted for (academic) “knowledge” as a whole, or
more generally, for the broad enterprise of knowledge production that is today
conventionally centred on the university. Acknowledging this as a moment of
crisis and transition, both in general and specifically regarding “knowledge” and
its institutions, elicits the key questions: Where are we? Where are we headed?
What, if anything, can be done about this? And what can the “economics of
science” contribute to this?
Starting with the last of these questions, clearly it depends on how
the “economics of science” is conceived. Here we shall assume a cultural
political economy perspective (CPE)—as argued elsewhere (Tyfield 2012a,
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b)—to investigate this moment of socio-technical system transition and its
tendencies. This involves analysis of the interaction between—or the parallel
co-production of—the specific systems of the production, utilisation and funding
of (“scientific”) knowledge, and the broader technologies of government (in the
Foucauldian sense) for the management of liberal states and the regularisation
of capital accumulation (Tyfield 2012c).
Such a perspective affords a characterisation of the core of the current
crises as a crisis of moral economy, i.e. of a popularly accepted moral order
that legitimates the given distribution of the fruits of human labour as at least
approximating due reward, given the contribution of their recipient. Yet this in
turn explains the particular importance of the crisis of knowledge production, for
there is an intimate and crucial connection between such a moral economy and
the production of socially-validated and socially-valued “knowledge.” In other
words, a transition in knowledge production is not “just another” case study,
but one of specific and central importance to a broader analysis of “system
transition.”
II. F  C  N S  C D
The global(izing) political economic dominance of neoliberalism in the
past few decades has undoubtedly transformed the “economics of science,”
with research and innovation both as key targets for the more general
programme of commercialization and corporate accumulation by dispossession,
to use Harvey’s (2005) terminology. Indeed, the resurgence of interest since
the mid-1990s in the “economics of science” was precisely in response to
the intensifying encounter of academia with market-based demands (Sent
1999). Since then a voluminous literature has emerged, praising, criticizing
and explaining the commercialisation of science, which we make no effort
to summarize here (Mirowski and Sent 2002, 2008; Tyfield 2012a). Rather,
our starting point is the specifically neoliberal model of research, innovation
and higher education that has emerged, most profoundly in the Anglo-Saxon
countries at the core of the global financialized economy, and the extraordinary
challenges it is increasingly facing.
These are inseparably crises of both the production and circulation of
knowledge—i.e. regarding the “use value” of the products of the university—and
of their economic viability—i.e. regarding their “exchange value.” In relation
to the “use value,” increasing enclosure of knowledge—especially in fields like
the life sciences that have been most actively pursued on the promise of
innovation super-rents—has indeed generated intensifying and self-defeating
problems of knowledge sharing (Heller & Eisenberg’s (1998) “anti-commons”),
while biotech-pharmaceutical pipelines continue to dry up (Mira 2012; Heller
2008). Moreover, as genomics, for instance, reveals a biological reality that is
hugely more complex than that envisaged, the problems of sharing data become
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even starker: fundamental progress in tackling these scientific problems calls
for even greater sharing of information and findings. This impales neoliberal
consumerist imaginaries of “personalized medicine” on the horns of dilemma:
sacrifice the market of genomic information for some sort of pooled and open
knowledge base, or give up all talk of a genomic revolution in healthcare.
As regards the laer—the “use value” of university knowledge products—the
crisis of financialization also has profound implications for the economic
viability of existing models of both research and higher education. Public
universities have been strangled by fiscal austerity, and both public and private
universities have found themselves with unsustainable levels of debt taken on
in the “good times” for the expansion of both research and student-aractive
leisure facilities (Economist 2012a), as knowledge has become a commodity.
Moreover, those relatively few universities that have been enormous winners
of the globalized, financialized competition, with large endowments and/or
patent/intellectual property portfolios, have also suffered drastic devaluations
in their financial assets (Christensen and Eyring 2011). The tightening of
university/departmental budgets has also dramatically transformed the career
structure, resulting in ever-diminishing chances of tenure or a permanent
position of some description. Instead, junior faculty are increasingly adjuncts
(76% of US faculty in 2013) hired on short-term contracts with lile if any
institutional financial support for the increasingly difficult task of building
a research profile and aending conferences, which in turn serve as the
arenas for future hiring opportunities (Kendzior 2012, 2013). And these adjunct
faculty are themselves increasingly weighed down with debt—in the United
States, student debt is the only form of debt that one cannot even escape by
bankruptcy.Moreover, as research becomes increasingly competitive, it becomes
cost-ineffective for permanent staff to teach undergraduates, this task being
handed over to the adjunct doctoral and post-doctoral teaching assistants
(Christensen and Eyring 2011). Yet the cost of student fees—and hence yet again,
debt—incurred by undergraduates continues to grow, leading on the one hand
to ever greater grievances from this crucial “customer” of the universities and
on the other to a “student loan bomb” (Kiplinger 2012).
In short, regarding both the generation of “the goods” and the “value for
money” (and thus financial viability), this neoliberal model is increasingly and
manifestly dysfunctional. What, then, is likely to happen? What could follow
this neoliberal model? An emergent answer to this question, garnering growing
interest especially amongst policy circles, is the cluster of innovations that
congregate around the discourse of “open science” and “online education.” And
indeed, partly as a maer of self-fulfilling policy initiative, there is increasing
evidence of such initiatives across research, the connection between research
and innovation, and higher education. These, however, must be understood
not merely as coincidental developments but as tendencies responding to the
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immanent tensions and challenges of the neoliberal model of the “knowledge
economy.”
These initiatives augur—and explicitly promise—profound transformation
across the full range of processes involved in the production and circulation
of knowledge centred on the university. For instance, following the lead of
emerging practices in the life sciences and, to a lesser extent, physics and
maths, the United Kingdom is rushing into effect a wholesale transformation
of the economics of scientific publishing towards “open access” (OA) (Finch
2012). Instead of the existing norm of a “reader pays” system—leading to
institutional subscriptions so that individual (but institutionally-employed)
researchers do not face unpayable fees to access the articles needed for their
research—OA demands that articles are all made free to the reader. In an
age of (supposedly) ubiquitous internet access, the argument goes, it is both
ridiculous and unjustifiable that such knowledge should circulate behind walls
(and thereby make significant profits for the publishing companies). OA, then,
opens up the resulting research to everyone (“tax payers”), not just those whose
employment confers the benefit of the institutionally paid-for access, with the
promise of “democratizing” science.
Moreover, the “democratization of science” has particular resonance given
the broader discourse of “open science,” in which the very process of scientific
problem solving (of a certain specific sort—see below) has been shown to
work extremely well—arguably even more efficiently—by way of open web
2.0/wiki real-time conversation amongst self-selecting groups comprising both
“professionals” and “amateurs” (Nielsen 2012; Royal Society 2012). Taken
together with OA, then, it is argued that unlocking all this scientific knowledge
will allow the full potential of human scientific ingenuity, wherever it may be, to
be actualized. Finally, the online “revolution” is also seen to be an unstoppable
tide in higher education; both cheaper, more “learning outcome”-focused
for-profit universities/colleges and (particularly since 2012) MOOCs, offering
individual courses for free, are seen as presenting an increasingly disruptive
wave of innovations (Daniel 2012; Edgecliffe-Johnson andCook 2013; Cadwalladr
2012).
It is clear that much of the heightened interest in and response to these
initiatives may itself be explained not so much by a sober assessment of
their potential as by the growing appreciation among institutional leaders in
the university and policy sectors of the intractable problems of the existing
model. Moreover, these interlocking “open” and “online” initiatives boast a
series of important strategic strengths, three of which stand out in particular.
First, they are instances of—and thus have the backing of—a much broader
ideological movement, which may be called the “Californian ideology,” in
allusion to its geographical spiritual home amongst the free soware/open
source (“FLOSS” (Berry 2008)) libertarian hactivists and 2.0 web entrepreneurs
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of Silicon Valley (two of the major MOOC companies, Coursera and Udacity, are
both spin-offs from Stanford). This provides its advocates not only with a highly
developed argument but also a broad activist community of backers. Second,
this community of backers is itself already highly (spectacularly!) wealthy
and powerful, as epitomized in the corporate person of Google. Finally, its
proponents describe the benefits of open science (in its various guises) in highly
experiential and affective—even spiritual—terms; they speak of epiphanies,
“wow moments” and life-transforming experiences in reference to their original
lay participation in the communal solving of a tough mathematical problem,
the greater satisfaction of blogging or open publishing, or the participation
(as student or teacher) in MOOCs (Nielsen 2012; Cadwalladr 2012). In short,
“open science” generates “true believers” to whom the continuing “revolution”
of science can be entrusted.
Yet this “open science” is also being met by growing numbers of sceptics,
naysayers and critics. For instance, the UK’s headlong dive into OA publishing
has raised multiple objections regarding the implications for scholarship and
its career structure, which are hard to dismiss as the special pleading of a
conservative “producer” interest-group (Disorder of Things 2012; Harnad 2013).
For instance, with readers no longer paying, the costs of publishing (short
of a full-scale move to “free” online publishing, which seems unlikely in the
extreme and is not favoured by policy) must instead pass to the article’s
author(s)—the so-called “gold” model. Alternatively, neither reader nor author
pays, but the journal may withhold unpaid access for a given (short) period aer
first publication (e.g. 12 or 24 months) in the hope of amassing institutional
subscriptions from those who cannot wait—the “green” model.
Both cases, however, entail the introduction of an economic model with
far-reaching and as-yet-unclear implications both for publishing itself and for
the multiple institutions that underpin the production of such research in
the first place—including not just universities, but also non-profit disciplinary
academies or learned institutions that may generate significant income from
publishing journals (Trueman 2013). At the very least, a wholesale shi to the
gold model (as the UK government currently favours) will inevitably introduce
a level of institutional oversight (which need not be disciplinary peer review)
to assess which articles the university should and should not pay to publish.
This will thus create significant inter-departmental and staff tensions (e.g.
senior vs. junior faculty) that could well destabilize whole institutions, especially
as all estimates to date show that current institutional budgets of British
universities could not possibly cover even existing (let alone future increased)
levels of publication (Trueman 2013). Gold OA will also, ironically, exclude from
publication anyone not employed by an institution that is willing to pay for the
publication of their research—i.e. the very opposite of the avowed intention of
“democratising” science—but in ways that would exclude emeritus faculty, those
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passing between positions, and junior (adjunct teaching?) faculty, not just the
proverbial lay enthusiast.
Similar objections to the economic and epistemic (i.e. regarding their effects
on their ostensible goal of encouraging greater dispersion of, and higher quality
of, knowledge and education) viability ofMOOCs as a newmodel of mainstream
higher education are also easy to formulate (Hill 2012). For instance, even
as established universities sign up to deliver MOOCs as partners of MOOC
initiatives, both private (e.g. Coursera, Udacity, EdX) and public (the UK’s
FutureLearn), their free provision and universities’ generalized refusal to count
such courses towards a degree highlight how far MOOCs remain from an
economic model capable of sustaining generalized higher education (Daniel
2012; Hill 2012).
Seen in this light, it may seem baffling that there is any interest at all, let
alone such intensive interest, in these initiatives: surely they offer no prospect
of a generalized transformation in the “economics of science” until they can
answer such fundamental questions. Yet this is to underestimate, or least
to misunderstand, the Californian ideology underlying such initiatives. For
its proponents, the experience of neoliberal and financialized innovation in
recent decades has been precisely the vindication of the mantra that one need
only take care of the open source product or service and the business model
will take care of itself in good time (e.g. Hern 2013)—not least through the
financialized realization of spectacular wealth with an IPO flotation on the
stock market. With example aer example of such a model, why should open
science be any different? Moreover, the more techno-utopian of its advocates
are commied to a vision—which they see being realized—of the creation of
a post-human(ist) techno-knowledge network in which information itself, as
a global “data web,” “wakes up” (Nielsen 2012). From such a perspective, the
utopia emerging via open and online network architectures will unleash such
a cornucopia of information-based wealth that prosperity will be effectively
limitless and ubiquitous, rendering “payment” for anything redundant, indeed
inconceivable—an historical relic of an idea (Cf Larnier 2013).
There is evidently insufficient space to unpack such arguments here. From a
CPE perspective, however, the key error here is the superficiality of its analysis
of the “economics of science,” specifically because it separates “science” (or
“knowledge,” too oen identified with data or information) and “money” into
a strict dichotomy. This is read by many (not just “open science” enthusiasts,
but also the diverse opponents and critics of neoliberalism) as a critical
move, as it appears not only to reinstantiate a dualism that neoliberalism’s
commercialisation of the academy has aempted to collapse—in which case
“good science” would simply be science that “the market” chooses to “buy”—but
then, further, to take the side of “science” vs. “money.” But the “Californists”
are peculiar and unlikely revolutionaries, as already described, and this is
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clear in the conceptualization of their core project. For, rather than licensing
a critical or radical rejection of commercialisation of knowledge production,
this fundamental distinction of science vs. money in turn licences, and/or is
underpinned by, an uer neglect of questions about the interaction of power and
knowledge and about their concentration, in the institutions of both “politics”
(i.e. states) and “economics” (i.e. corporations and financial assets).
The absence of “power” in their analysis is a descriptive/explanatory,
pragmatic and normative failing. It is an explanatory gap in that the trajectory
of any future system transition will be inexplicable without reference to power
(see below). And it is a pragmatic and normative problem in that it argues
for a future that is both socially problematic and manifestly self-defeating. As
poacher-turned-gamekeeper Jaron Larnier has argued (2011, 2013), the strict
money vs. science distinction of the “open science” argument can underpin
an emerging political economy of knowledge (and of human creativity more
broadly) that tends continually to undermine the compensation of human
knowledge labour—albeit under the seemingly democratizing banner of “free
information”—upon which such a system is entirely dependent. Furthermore,
this analysis not only thereby destroys the “livelihoods” of a genuinely “creative”
“knowledge-based economy” but also sponsors the construction of a system
characterized by even more concentrated corporate control of knowledge (eg.
information, data) than that of the IP-intensive corporatemodel of neoliberalism
it ostensibly subverts.
The beneficiaries of this new knowledge political economy are thus
overwhelmingly the four corporate giants of the web 2.0 internet age—Amazon,
Apple, Facebook and Google. These companies have assumed such dominance
by forging uniquely enabled network positions that can harness the “free
labour” of billions of users (or “prosumers”)—possibly infringing intellectual
property rights in the process, exploiting counter-cultural “free information”
cachet in the process—and then control and monetize the resulting “big data”
sets of information with exceptionally proprietorial business models. Finally,
the emergence of such corporate concentration of power (not just financial,
but also involving power over knowledge and its production and circulation) is
immunized from critique precisely because of the strict conceptual separation of
“science” and “money,” which places these “free information” companies firmly
on the side of the angels.
The Big Four (e.g. Economist 2012b) have unprecedented leverage over
the emerging political economy of knowledge, given its control over various
sectors: Amazon (not just e-commerce, but also e-publishing); Facebook (with
social media and associated technologies of “social search” and mapping, hence
day-to-day knowledge and consumer choices or recommendations); Apple (the
products of “creative industries” via iTunes, etc.); and, most of all, Google.
Not only is Google driving the development of increasingly indispensable
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portals for the access and search of scholarly writing (viz, Google Scholar,
Google Books, Google Docs for collaborative draing and arguably Google
Translate), but it also has fingers in numerous “open science” pies, including
the personal genomics firm 23andme (run by Google’s Sergei Bryn’s wife)
and its project of “Research 2.0,” in which 23andme customers are encouraged
to participate in research both by contributing their genomic data and by
participating in associated web 2.0 “open science” projects that the company
then owns. Other Google initiatives include the development of real-time data
regarding outbreaks of infectious disease, by using “big data” correlations with
geographical clusters of specific Google search terms; an interest in MOOCs;
or as a paradigm example of “data-driven intelligence” (Nielsen 2012). Yet,
for all this ubiquitous presence of corporate behemoths, discussion among
“open science” (or “data web”) advocates is marked by the glaring absence of
any discussion of corporate power or, at most, its sanguine presumption that
corporations are essentially benign (e.g. Nielsen 2012; Naughton 2013; Schmidt
and Cohen 2013).
This Californist “open science” discourse proposes an economics of
science destructive of a political economic system that could sustain the
(professionalized) production of such knowledge. Furthermore, it is premised
on a system characterised (with increasing transparency) by a fundamental
break between its explicit values of openness and mass participation
and its actual political economic structure of historically unprecedented
corporate concentration, mass redundancy and professional insecurity of actual
“knowledge workers” (and—an explosive scandal in the UK and then US in May
2013—off-shore tax avoidance, forcing even a newspaper editorial from Google’s
executive chairman, Eric Schmidt (2013; Bowers and Syal 2013) in response).
These issues come together as a maer of moral economy.
III. L   M E  S
By “moral economy” we mean here the conjunction of the system of the
distribution of economic gains and compensation with a generalized sense that
such allocation is a reasonable reflection of the effort and social worth of
any given individual’s specific contribution or labour; in other words, that the
“economy” is “moral,” justified by the “fair shares” that are its outcome. From a
CPE perspective, one may expect that any reasonably durable and stable form of
life depends upon such a moral economy to sustain acceptance of what would
otherwise be challenged as inequalities and injustices of outcome. Yet such a
moral economy is all the more important for a capitalist society given both the
central importance of “the economy” to its specific form of social order and
the “inherent improbability of capital accumulation” (Jessop 2002). Capitalist
societies thus depend upon a specific and concrete selement to deflate, albeit
always only temporarily, the multiple contradictions of capital that are insoluble
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in the abstract. And, indeed, establishing such a rational justification of the
distribution of wealth within a capitalist society has been the primary task of
“economics” ever since the classical political economy of Smith and Ricardo
(Clarke 1982).
A crisis of moral economy, therefore, involves the emergence of a conjunction
in which wealth and poverty compound in ways that are met with popular
disillusionment and anger rather than enthusiasm and/or acceptance. And as
this in turn threatens to undermine the political economic selement upon
which continued capital accumulation rests, such a crisis also thereby spells an
existential test for any such political economy. A crisis in the moral economy of
knowledge production, however, is not merely another example of such a crisis,
but one that is of specific importance and systemic significance for a broader
regime of liberal government and regularization of capitalist economies. This
is due to the central importance, in the context of modern liberal societies, of
“rational” knowledge in such a “moral” order and, conversely, of moral and social
authority in stabilizing a specific model of knowledge production.
By “liberal” here we are referring to a specifically modern form of
the government of societies centred on the construction of new human
freedoms (formally universal, substantively limited) expressive of the core
value of individual autonomy. Yet both the intelligibility/legitimacy of
this form of government and its actual administration depend uerly on
knowledge-technologies and their purported epistemic authority that render
it not only “rational,” but also “unarguably” so, to conduct oneself in certain
ways conducive to social order. But this in turn demands a social system for
the production of knowledge that is itself popularly understood (not least by
those individuals and groups formed and empowered by this very system)
as rational and hence socially/morally defensible. A key element of such a
judgement is whether or not the system adequately compensates those involved
in the production of such knowledge, so that the system can sustain processes
of knowledge production and circulation. And this in turn legitimates the
given social bargain of compensation for those producing knowledge, which
contributes to this moral vision of society.
In fact, for liberal regimes the primary epistemic issue regarding generalized
government of a society is not the specific mechanisms of science and/or
professional “knowledge production” but rather the social mechanisms that are
understood to make the best decisions in order both to instantiate individual
autonomy and to ensure social order. For liberal regimes, the key institution here
is themarket, the limits it imposes on state (or other forms of hierarchical) power
and conversely its own limits (if any), such that the core paradox of capitalist
economies—namely how exchange at (“fair”) value nevertheless generates
profit(s)—may be considered “resolved.” The specific assessment of the market,
however, may (and has historically) change(d): for instance, classical eighteenth
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and nineteenth century liberalism conceived of the market as the “natural”
result of man’s (sic) “propensity to truck, barter and exchange,” such that laissez
faire would simply open up the possibility for the spontaneous emergence of
markets. Moreover, where markets do not thus emerge, due to “market failure,”
the state has a legitimate, but strictly circumscribed, role to play. Conversely,
neoliberalism conceives the market as in need of active construction with
the assistance of state power. Such projects of construction are imperative,
however, because the market is essentially unlimited as a mechanism for social
decision-making, so that “market failure” demands correction of the market
rather than its replacement by public provision (Mirowski 2011).
The moral economy of liberal regimes is thus intrinsically epistemic and
primarily justified in epistemic terms. Yet the moral economy of knowledge
production per se remains an issue of central—indeed, pivotal—importance, even
as it may be seen as a relatively peripheral “sector” of “the economy.” For a
system of social government and decision-making cannot simultaneously be
judged to be optimal and rational while also producing transparently irrational
and dysfunctional results in the very production and circulation of “rational”
scientific knowledge. Hence, a crisis of moral economy of knowledge production
is like an infection affecting an artery or taproot of the entire “body politic”
and passing swily to a judgement regarding the epistemic validity—and hence
morality or fairness—of the core epistemic mechanisms of liberal society more
broadly, i.e. the market as currently conceptualized. In other words, regarding
the specific example of neoliberalism, if a “marketplace of ideas” is manifestly
viewed as dysfunctional, it undermines not just a particular conception of how to
organize science (“a marketplace of ideas”) but rather the very foundation stone
of the edifice of the power regime of neoliberal government per se (“amarketplace
of ideas” and of all things): for how can the market any longer be trusted to be
the optimal decision-maker and epistemic mechanism when it evidently fails as
a mechanism for the production of knowledge?
A crisis in the moral economy of knowledge production, therefore, entails
a judgement that the current system of knowledge production is itself
irrational; and this in turn spells the unravelling of a fundamental thread
of the moral economy of the liberal government of capitalist societies per
se, without which it loses all credible claims to be “rational” and thus fair
in its economic outcomes. This foundation stone, therefore, of “rational”
liberal government-by-freedoms is the specific “economy of science” of the
credit/reputation system, understood in its broadest sense as an epistemic
economy, which includes peer review, referencing and citations, competitive
grants, and the assessment and aribution of scientific status. From this
perspective, the credit/reputation system is not merely a slightly unhealthy
fascination of the ambitious professional researcher. Rather it is a social system
that serves the crucial governmental role of administering and legitimizing the
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actual funding of the social production of knowledge and its social and economic
integration, in turn affording the “going-on” of a liberal power regime. The
credit/reputation system, qua moral economy in liberal society, is thus primarily
tasked with the knowledgeable assessment of the production of knowledgeable
people.
Such a definition captures two inseparable elements of this system: first,
what must be, for such knowledge to be judged “rational” and “scientific”
and thus act as moral support for liberal government, intrinsic criteria of
the assessment of knowledge on its own terms; and second, the irreducible
socio-historical situatedness and hence extrinsic social criteria of what may
be taken to count as “knowledgeable,” not least in the sense of such
knowledge being of “value” to society, and how this aribution of value
hinges on the production of (specific, socially situated) people, not an abstract
thing called “knowledge.” From a political perspective, “science” (a system
of credit/reputation) primarily produces scientists, not science (i.e. scientific
knowledge). It also highlights how any given selement of the meaning of this
definition is irreducibly saturated with power. The first thus excludes marketing
and public relations, the laer astrology. Furthermore, this system of knowledge
productionmust also act as a measurement technology that affords the bridging
between the sui generis assessment of individual knowledge contributions and
their levels of economic reward, i.e. as the moral economy of science. For it
is evidently the case that science must be funded and on some basis. And
again, those disciplines that are thus rewarded are thereby empowered for the
future “rational” legitimation of their social and epistemic standing. From this
perspective, however, it is clear that how and to what extent specific knowledge
projects are funded is irreducibly a cultural and political issue—connected to the
understanding of the nature of knowledge and its production, how and what
knowledge is of value and for what liberal governmental purposes—and never
just an “economic” one.
Finally, focusing on the assessment of the production of knowledgeable
people, hence knowledgeable labour power, thus includes not only the processes
of research and the construction of researchers and research careers but also
those of higher education. For it is in higher education that aainment of
knowledge of broader applicability “in society” receives the all-important stamp
of approval from the “knowledgeable assessors”—experts in the relevant field
who have themselves completed socially-defined apprenticeships and bear the
marks of this aainment.
Such a widening of definition is crucial because it presents the broader
social significance of institutions of higher learning and the crucial, and possibly
divergent, imperatives that the system of knowledge production must juggle
as a system. In other words, the “economics of science” must be understood
as a system of materialized, socio-technical practices that underpin and are
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performed as a distinctive moral economy. Moreover, from this perspective we
can begin to explore the concrete mechanisms through which a crisis of moral
economy of the production of knowledge can “infect” the rest of the given liberal
regime of government. Collapse of such amoral economy in turn undermines the
creation of both the knowledge and the specific forms of knowledgeable labour
power demanded across the society and economy. And conversely, we can see
how a transition in the production of knowledge must itself be a systemic, not
piecemeal, change, and how such a transition in turn raises profound questions
about broader transition in the liberal power regime.
For instance, as regards the former, this systemic perspective undermines
arguments (both boosterism and jeremiads) that look one-sidedly at specific
issues in the transformation of the economy of knowledge production, such
as how web 2.0 is going to transform “science”—defined as mathematically
solvable problems, with no comment regarding sciences tackling more
engaged or “complex” problems, let alone the humanities (Nielsen 2012)—or
undergraduate teaching, defined as measurable learning outcomes desired by
business employers using increasingly sophisticated online “learning analytics,”
with no mention of their relationship to “research” or scholarship of those
supposedly accredited with conducting such assessment. Conversely, this
systemic perspective highlights how any sustainable systems transition depends
on the forging not only of an acceptable division of epistemic labour, regarding
the emergence of new sites for research in existing fields and disciplines.
Transition also demands a new accommodation of the immanent connection
between the development of new knowledge (according to the internal norms
of a specific discipline or field of knowledge) and the teaching and accreditation
of the next generation of scholars, professional-practical users of this knowledge
and/or lay citizens appreciating the intrinsic andmoral/ social/ aesthetic value of
this learning—and thus willing to support it as “tax-payers,” alumni or investors.
Moreover, as a crisis of moral economy we can also see how there must
be a new, newly acceptable division of epistemic labour not only between the
“academic” and the “practical” aspects of specific “useful” sciences, but also
(which is crucially overlooked) between these “useful” sciences and “useless”
subjects, oen in the arts or humanities (Collini 2012). It is the laer in particular
that are tasked with producing and popularly disseminating the vital (and
critically interrogated and robust) knowledges of legitimation of the emergent
system.
On the other hand, regarding the inseparable interconnection between a
transition of knowledge production system and the broader liberal power regime
and moral economy, this systemic perspective highlights what is systematically
overlooked in Californist accounts; namely that a viable system of knowledge
production (including higher education) needs a cultural political economy that
has jobs for the graduates—and sufficiently well-paid, rewarding and secure
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jobs (including in academia itself) to be able to pay down the debts of higher
education and/or be worth the bother of taking courses at all—not just cheaper
courses producing “appropriate skills.” Again, this thus makes any system
transition in knowledge production today inseparable from a broader transition
in political economy that tackles the crisis of youth unemployment across
the global North (Economist 2013) with the emergence of new and vigorous
industries that create more jobs than they destroy ; something the internet and
web 2.0 has singularly failed to achieve to date (Larnier 2013).
A systemic perspective thus promises a more balanced analysis of the
prospects of specific, possibly “disruptive” (Christensen and Eyring 2011),
innovations in knowledge production than accounts that focus on these “open
science” innovations alone. But such an account must also be alert to the central
importance of power, conceived as a productive and normatively ambiguous
social force—an important gap in much of the systems transition literature
(Smith and Stirling 2007; Kern 2011). For it is only in the reconfiguration
and production of new powerful groups that a transition can both emerge, in
competition with existing “locked-in” systems, and then sustain itself.
This, again, is particularly important for a system of knowledge production
(and analysis of transition thereof). The system’s self-sustaining dynamic
hinges on socially authoritative judgements regarding aainment of knowledge
achievements (whether novel research or training to an appropriate standard)
that are made by powerful groups, while also forging and reproducing these
powerful groups precisely by way of their control over the production and
circulation of such knowledge. As such, they are the chief beneficiaries and
guardians of a new “common sense,”—hence a new moral economy—and
thus the driving force behind its construction. However, stabilization of such
“common sense,” i.e. system transition, goes far beyond the construction
of self-legitimizing explicit knowledge claims and the technologies and
institutions that produce them. Rather, insofar as it is a liberal power regime,
stabilization also involves the discursive-material, socio-technical redefinition
of core philosophical conceptualizations and commitments regarding ontology,
epistemology and science, “nature” and humanity, economic “progress” and “the
good life.”
For instance, liberalism (as government through freedoms) hinges on the
popular (and powerful) appeal of its central claim regarding the human
individual as both ontologically and morally the relevant unit and starting-point
for reasoning about society. Yet what is the human individual in an age of web
2.0 social networks and (possibly cyborg) bodily and mental enhancement? This
question alerts us to the key role of profound conceptual shis—themselves in
the form of a constellation or system of interlocking and relational redefinitions
that must shi in toto to a relatively stable new configuration—that constitute
such a new and uncoerced “common sense” moral economy which is both
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newly powerful and “rightly” or “rationally”so. And this is, in turn, the core of
a system transition. There is, however, no abstract solution, no a priori Platonic
blueprint, to guide such rearrangements of understanding. Rather, both any
such transition and its subsequent stabilization is irreducibly a power-laden
process in which the shi occurs precisely to the extent that it specifically
empowers the group who stand to benefit most from it, and to the extent that
those resisting it are disempowered and/or can be marginalized.
In sum, then, the ongoing crisis in knowledge production may be most
productively analysed by aending to evidence of the emergence of new groups,
powerfully enabled by knowledge technologies and socio-technical practices
emerging simultaneously, who are transforming fundamental philosophical
concepts that together could support a systems transition in themoral economy of
the production of knowledge, and thence of liberal government more generally.
IV. T  N ‘K E’ S S
From this perspective, let us now return to a brief assessment of “where
we are.” First, it becomes even clearer that the neoliberal project is now
bust across the multiple levels of a system of knowledge production and
its moral economy: economically, as the funding models of the broader
credit/reputation system of research and education unravels; epistemically, as
the failure of neoliberal economies of research to tackle global crises with
meaningful breakthroughs becomes ever more grave, while those of teaching
are met with increasing disgruntlement from students, future employers and
(adjunct) teaching staff alike; and morally, in that luck and status, and not
effort and talent, are increasingly seen as the definitive factors in educational
and/or knowledge-professional success. While neoliberalism remains “strangely
non-dead” (Crouch 2010) and still dominant or even resurgent (Mirowski 2013),
it is also essentially broken, denuded of any broader social legitimacy and, as
such, vulnerable to the emergence of any alternative liberal project capable of
coalescing a broad coalition and a redefined moral vision.
In this respect, a central problematic for transition in such a liberal
system and the emergence of any such alternative is the reinsertion of
the autonomous individual (suitably redefined) at the heart of the system’s
moral self-presentation. This is a prerequisite of the establishment of a new
restabilized selement because of the central importance of the autonomous,
thinking individual as the locus, in liberal societies, of moral judgement and
thus also where descriptive and normative judgement—epistemic and moral
economies—come together. Moreover, in moving “beyond” neoliberalism and its
palpable irrationalities, such a transition depends upon an explicit repudiation
of neoliberalism’s epistemology. This is its epistemic market foundationalism,
which judges the super-human information processor of the market to be both
epistemically—and hence morally—superior to the (rational Homo Economicus,
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let alone fragile, somatic, encultured and cognitively limited actual human)
individual. Thus while the crisis of neoliberalism more generally is manifest
in terms of economic dysfunction, the collapse of this power regime is finally
precipitated via growing popular refusal to accept the diminution of one’s
personal moral status (reflected in a moral economy of now demonstrably
unfair compensation) vis-à-vis a market that is not only failing economically but
also manifestly failing epistemically; i.e. irrational, prejudiced, stupid, ignorant,
blind, etc.
Moreover, it is clear that the utopian (or dystopian, depending on one’s
position) visions of Californist “open science,” or what may more broadly be
called “Googliberalism,” themselves have no prospect of achieving this. Rather
Googliberalism is itself highly (not just inherently—as are all selements in the
longer term) unstable because it essentially leaves intact (or rather radicalizes)
neoliberalism’s account of the market as super-human information processor,
most spectacularly in its post-human discourse of the “waking up” of the
internet. Yet, as we have seen above, one needs only to ask the more humdrum
question of “where are the jobs?” to see that the focus in such accounts is firmly
at the system level of the global “data web” and the accelerated “progress” of
“science” while totally neglecting that of the human individual and his/her place
in such a society. It thus fails (and is likely to be seen to do so relatively quickly)
precisely the test of moral economy that has triggered the breakdown of the
passing order and the pursuit of transition to another: it massively rewards the
undeserving and impoverishes the many and fails to deliver the “goods” of more,
beer and more-democratically-engaged knowledge that tackles the urgent and
“wicked” problems of the multiple environmental, health and resource-based
crises.
Yet this is not in any sense to argue that the Googliberal vision and
Californist movement is without significant effect as regards the system
transition. Indeed, while it can only be a temporary and rapidly self-destructive
reality, it is a crucial element, social force and way station in the overarching
trajectory of system transition. For it has not only transformed the political
debate, bringing the crisis of neoliberalism’s proprietorial economy of science to
a head; but it is also a movement that, bolstered both by its powerful emergent
knowledge technologies and the strong affective experiences of epiphany these
generate for many, can boast a commied and growing hardcore of activist
supporters. Yet not everyone in the world, and, more importantly, not everyone
in existing positions of power is a “geek,” delighting in the communal solution of
chess or maths problems. The key front, therefore, on which these web 2.0 and
open science initiatives, conceived as power technologies, may be expected to
have the greatest and most profound effect in the course of a systems transition
is in seing the questions, the agenda, if not the outcomes, in the broader,
contested redefinition of the philosophical worldview underpinning a newmoral
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economy.
As such, the new post-transition selement may well be informatively
described as a“liberalism 2.0” in that it is both a seled liberal moral economy
and one firmly based on web 2.0. This is a new power regime and associated
moral economy of knowledge production. And it will be emergent to the extent it
has laboriously constructed the socio-technical systems, powerful coalitions and
revised philosophical concepts that afford, at least for a broad-based coalition
of the newly powerful, opportunities for individual advancement and new
freedoms; new freedoms that make full use of the various potentials for “open
science’”and web 2.0 in terms of “progress” in standards of living, knowledge
and knowledgeable social action. And, of course, one that does so in ways that
also furnish new ways to “rationally” justify those who are excluded from these
benefits.
There is, of course, no guarantee that such a restabilized selement
will emerge or is even possible. Indeed, such a re-established selement for
the “economics of science” remains a way off, and will not be achieved
without significant social, political, cultural and possibly military upheaval
via a turbulent, power-laden and morally contestable process. We are, indeed,
merely at the start of a protracted process of “transition’”in the economics of
science—and this will not be amenable to shortcuts by way of abstract blueprints
and academic definition. The perspective outlined above, however, does at least
alert us to the bare bones of what a new selement may look like and how it
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